Business cycle and financial cycle spillovers in the G7 countries by Antonakakis, Nikolaos et al.
Business Cycle and Financial Cycle Spillovers in the G7 Countries
Nikolaos Antonakakisa,b,∗, Max Breitenlechnerc, Johann Scharlerc
aVienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics, Institute for International
Economics, Welthandelsplatz 1, 1020, Vienna, Austria.
bUniversity of Portsmouth, Department of Economics and Finance, Portsmouth Business School, Portland
Street, Portsmouth, PO1 3DE, United Kingdom.
cUniversity of Innsbruck, Department of Economics, Universitaetsstrasse 15, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria.
Abstract
In this study we examine the dynamic interactions between credit growth and output growth
using the spillover index approach of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). Based on quarterly data on
credit growth and GDP growth over the period 1957Q1–2012Q4 for the G7 countries we find
that: (i) spillovers between credit growth and GDP growth evolve rather heterogeneously
over time and across countries, and increase during extreme economic events. (ii) Spillovers
between credit growth and GDP growth are of bidirectional nature, indicating bidirectional
spillovers of shocks between the financial and the real sector. (iii) In the period shortly
before and during the global financial crisis, the link between credit growth and GDP growth
becomes more pronounced. In particular, the financial sector plays a dominant role during
the early stages of the crisis, while the real sector quickly takes over as the dominant source
of spillovers. (iv) Interestingly, credit growth in the US is the dominant transmitter of shocks
to the G7 countries, and especially to other G7 countries’ real sectors in the run up period
to (and during) the global financial crisis. Overall, our results suggest that the magnitude
and direction of spillovers between financial cycles and business cycles vary over time along
with changes in the economic environment in the G7 countries.
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1. Introduction
The view that macroeconomic and financial sector developments are closely interrelated
has a long tradition and has received renewed interest in the aftermath of the 2008-2009
crisis. The implications of financial frictions for the business cycle and the interrelationship
between the financial sector and real economic activity have been extensively studied (see
for example, Bernanke et al., 1996, 1999; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997; Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009;
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Jermann and Quadrini, 2012, among many others). Empirically,
Taylor and Schularick (2012) show that credit growth is a predictor of financial crises.1
Recessions which are associated with financial disruptions are generally deeper and last
longer (see also Claessens et al., 2012; Jorda` et al., 2013).2
Yet, the aforementioned studies on the link between real credit growth and real GDP
growth have so far confined themselves to static analyses. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the time-varying relationship between real credit growth and real GDP growth at
business cycle frequencies for each of the G7 countries. To do so, we apply the VAR-based
spillover index approach recently introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012). This
methodology allows us to decompose spillovers into those coming from (or to) a particular
fundamental source and thus, to identify the main recipients and transmitters of shocks.
The dynamic evolution of the importance of finance cycle and business cycle spillover effects
can be assessed using a rolling window estimation and illustrated using spillover plots. The
spillover methodology, which was originally applied to study the interaction between asset
returns (Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009, 2012), has already attracted significant attention. For
instance, it has been applied successfully to exchange rates (McMillan and Speight, 2010;
Buba´k et al., 2011; Antonakakis, 2012), equity markets (Yilmaz, 2010; Zhou et al., 2012),
sovereign bond yield spreads (Antonakakis and Vergos, 2013), business cycles, growth and
1Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2011) provide similar studies with empirical
evidence pointing in the same direction. See also Martin and Rey (2006) for international aspects.
2A related, although somewhat distinctive branch of the literature studies the impact of structural credit
supply shocks on the business cycle (see for example Buch and Neugebauer, 2011; Helbling et al., 2011;
Peersman, 2011; Gambetti and Musso, 2012; Meeks, 2012; Hristov et al., 2012).
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volatility spillovers (Yilmaz, 2009; Antonakakis and Badinger, 2012), and money supply and
financial asset spillovers (Cronin, 2014).
In line with Koop et al. (1996), Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2012),
our analysis is based on a generalized vector autoregressive framework (VAR), in which
forecast-error variance decompositions are invariant to the ordering of the variables.3 In
the context of the present study, this is particularly important since it is difficult, if not
impossible, to justify one particular causal ordering of the variables. Theoretical, as well as
empirical contributions, suggest that credit growth and changes in real economic activity
are strongly intertwined with causality potentially running in both directions.
Of course, the generalized VAR framework has advantages as well as drawbacks. A
disadvantage is that it aggravates the identification of causal effects in a strict sense in the
impulse response analysis. Nevertheless, by fully accounting for the pattern of observed
correlation between shocks it increases the relevance from a policy perspective in light of the
increased synchronization of shocks between credit growth and the business cycle. Based
on the aforementioned considerations, we employ the generalized version of the spillover
methodology of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).
We find that the strength of spillover effects between credit growth and real GDP growth
varies strongly across the G7 countries and over time. While Germany, Japan and the US
exhibit reasonably high spillover effects between credit growth and output growth with
around 20 percent in total and with approximately 30 percent between financial and real
sectors, Canada, France, Italy and the UK are characterized by total spillover effects of
below 10 percent. However, credit growth is as much a sender as it is a receiver of spillovers
in each country. We also find that spillovers increase during recession periods. Finally, the
analysis of spillover effects among the G7 economies suggests that the US is at the epicentre
of the credit shocks transmission to other G7 countries’ financial and real sectors before and
during the global financial crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the application of the spillover
3In contrast to a Cholesky-factor identification, which was originally used in the spillover analysis (see
Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009).
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index approach so as to disentangle the intricate relationships between credit growth and
GDP growth and outlines the data used. Section 3 presents the empirical findings. Section
4 summarizes the results and concludes this study.
2. Empirical Methodology and Data
2.1. Measuring Spillovers
The spillover index approach introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009) builds on the
seminal work on VAR models by Sims (1980) and the well-known notion of variance decom-
positions. This approach allows an assessment of the contributions of shocks to variables
to the forecast error variances of both the respective and the other variables of the model.
Using a rolling-window estimation, the evolution of spillover effects can be traced over time
and illustrated by spillover plots. For the purpose of the present study, we use the vari-
ant of the spillover index in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012), which extends and generalizes the
methodology introduced in Diebold and Yilmaz (2009).
The starting point for the analysis is the following P -th order, K-variable VAR
yt =
P∑
p=1
Θiyt−i + εt, (1)
where yt = (y1t, y2t, . . . , yKt) is a vector of K endogenous variables, Θi, i = 1, ..., P, are
K ×K parameter matrices and εt ∼ (0,Σ) is vector of disturbances that are independently
distributed over time; t = 1, ..., T is the time index and k = 1, ..., K is the variable index.
Fundamental to the dynamics of the system is the moving average representation of
model (1), which is given by yt =
∑∞
j=0Ajεt−j, where the K × K coefficient matrices Aj
are recursively defined as Aj = Θ1Aj−1 + Θ2Aj−2 + . . . + ΘpAj−p, where A0 is the K ×K
identity matrix and Aj = 0 for j < 0.
Following Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) we use the generalized VAR framework of Koop
et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which produces variance decompositions invariant
to the variable ordering. According to this framework, the H-step-ahead forecast error
variance decomposition is
φij(H) =
σ−1jj
∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣej)
2∑H−1
h=0 (e
′
iAhΣA
′
hei)
, (2)
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where Σ is the (estimated) variance matrix of the error vector ε, σjj the (estimated) standard
deviation of the error term for the j-th equation and ei a selection vector with one as the i-th
element and zeros otherwise. This yields a K × K matrix φ(H) = [φij(H)]i,j=1,...K , where
each entry gives the contribution of variable j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
The main diagonal elements contains the (own) contributions of shocks to the variable i to
its own forecast error variance, the off-diagonal elements show the (cross) contributions of
the other variables j to the forecast error variance of variable i.
Since the own and cross-variable variance contribution shares do not sum to one under the
generalized decomposition, i.e.,
∑K
j=1 φij(H) 6= 1, each entry of the variance decomposition
matrix is normalized by its row sum, such that
φ˜ij(H) =
φij(H)∑K
j=1 φij(H)
(3)
with
∑K
j=1 φ˜ij(H) = 1 and
∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H) = K by construction.
This ultimately allows to define a total (volatility) spillover index as
TS(H) =
∑K
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑K
i,j=1,i 6=j φ˜ij(H)
K
× 100, (4)
which gives the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all (other) variables to the
total forecast error variance.
This approach is quite flexible and allows to obtain a more differentiated picture by
considering directional spillovers: Specifically, the directional spillovers received by variable
i from all other variables j are defined as
DSi←j(H) =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ij(H)
× 100 =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ij(H)
K
× 100 (5)
and the directional spillovers transmitted by variable i to all other variables j as
DSi→j(H) =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)∑K
i,j=1 φ˜ji(H)
× 100 =
∑K
j=1,j 6=i φ˜ji(H)
K
× 100. (6)
Notice that the set of directional spillovers provides a decomposition of total spillovers into
those coming from (or to) a particular source.
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By subtracting Equation (5) from Equation (6) the net spillover from variable i to all
other variables j are obtained as
NSi(H) = DSi→j(H)−DSi←j(H), (7)
providing information on whether a country (variable) is a receiver or transmitter of shocks
in net terms. Put differently, Equation (7) provides summary information about how much
each market contributes to the volatility in other markets, in net terms.
Overall, the spillover index approach provides measures of the intensity of interdepen-
dences across countries and variables and allows a decomposition of spillover effects by source
and recipient.
In the context of the present study, we posit the following hypothesis: The direction
and magnitude of spillovers between financial cycles and business cycles is time-varying
and depends on global, as well as country-specific events. In particular, since the recent
financial crisis, which originated in the US and lead to disruptions in the financial system
and economic activity worldwide, we hypothesize that the US is at the epicentre of financial
cycle spillovers during this period. Conversely, during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, we
hypothesize that financial spillovers originating in Japan are more pronounced.
2.2. Data description
We collect quarterly data on domestic credit, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP
deflator for the G7 countries over the period 1957Q1-2012Q4 from the International Financial
Statistics database (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).4 The values of all
variables are taken at the start of each quarter. Domestic credit is defined as total claims of
banks with national residency. To obtain the maximum length for each country we combine
the two series “Domestic Credit” and “Domestic Claims” from the IFS dataset. The choice
of the specific time period and countries is purely based on data availability and on the
4Only for Canada’s domestic credit, we prefer to use data from the Statistics Canada instead. This
decision was mainly driven by the fact that: i) the IFS credit series for Canada ends already in 2008Q4 and
ii) in 2001Q4 the series jumps significantly due to changes in the definition of the variable (Canada adopted
the IMF’s “Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual 2000” in 2001).
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examination of financial cycles and business cycles among developed countries, respectively.
See Table 1 for specific data availability in each country and a detailed list of each variable
and its data source (including all specific table codes).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We then deflate the credit and GDP series by the GDP deflator to obtain their real
counterparts. Finally, we take the fourth differences of the natural logarithms of real credit
and real GDP so as to obtain year-on-year real credit growth rates and real GDP growth
rates, respectively.5
Descriptive statistics on year-on-year real credit growth and real GDP growth rates are
presented in Table 2. The UK experienced the highest rate of real credit growth (56.39
percent) in the sample. Equivalently, Japan exhibits the highest growth rate of real GDP
(15.39 percent). The countries’ averages of real credit and real GDP growth lie within [3.46,
7.28] percent and [1.33, 4.35] percent, respectively. The range, as well as the relatively
high standard deviations across the G7 countries, reveal a substantial variation within the
variables.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
3. Results
3.1. Spillovers between Credit Growth and Output Growth within countries
In Table 3 we report estimates of the spillover indices for each country based on 12-
quarters ahead forecast error variance decompositions.6 For each country, the ij-th entry,
where i and j denote credit growth or output growth, is the estimated contribution to
the forecast error variance of variable i coming from innovations to variable j. Hence, the
diagonal elements (i = j) measure own-variable spillovers of output growth and credit growth
5We have also explored the robustness of our results based on the cyclical components of quarterly real
GDP (credit), defined as deviation of the logged actual from potential GDP (credit); the latter is obtained
as the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series of (the logarithm of) the countries real GDP (credit). These results
are very similar to those presented below and thus omitted for the sake of brevity.
6The lag–length of the VAR specifications is based on the Akaike Information Critetion (AIC).
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within countries, while the off-diagonal elements (i 6= j) capture cross-variable spillovers
between output growth and credit growth. The total volatility spillover index defined in
Equation (4) is approximately equal to the grand off-diagonal entry relative to the column
sum including diagonals (or row sum including diagonals), expressed in percentage points.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Summarizing the information in Table 3, we see that the strength of spillovers between
credit growth and output growth is rather heterogeneous across the G7 countries. Total
spillovers are relatively high in Germany, Japan and in the US with total spillover indices of
36.5 percent, 25 percent and 21.8 percent respectively. In contrast, in the UK (7.7 percent)
and Canada (7.6 percent) total spillovers are relatively low suggesting that credit growth
and the business cycle are not as closely linked. In France and Italy the estimated values for
the total spillover index are slightly higher with 9.7 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively.
Turning to the directional spillovers we see that countries with high total spillovers also
have relatively high spillovers from credit growth to output growth ranging from 22.1 percent
in Japan to 31.8 percent in Germany. In the US, credit growth contributes 27.8 percent to
fluctuations in output growth. While these spillovers are quantitatively sizable, we also see
that spillovers originating in the real sector of the economy have a substantial impact on the
dynamics of credit with directional spillover indices of 15.8 percent in the US, 27.9 percent in
Japan and 42.3 percent in Germany. In the remaining countries in our sample, directional
spillovers are generally low with estimated directional spillover indices below 10 percent.
The only exception is Italy, wherein the directional spillover index from output growth to
credit growth is 14.4 percent.
Overall, we see that, throughout the countries in our sample, credit growth is as much
a sender as it is a receiver of spillovers indicating bidirectional spillovers of shocks between
the financial and the real sector.
Although the use of an average measure of financial and business cycle spillovers provides
a good indication of the financial and business cycle transmission mechanism, it might mask
interesting information on movements in spillovers due to secular features of financial and
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business cycles. Hence, we are very interested in examining how total and net spillovers
evolve over time and whether they are affected by major economic events, such as the latest
crisis. To achieve that, we estimate the model in Equation (1) using 50-quarter rolling
windows and obtain the variance decompositions and spillover indices in a time-varying
fashion.7 Figure 1 plots the time-varying total spillover indices for each country in our
sample, based on the rolling window estimation.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
In Germany and the US, which are characterized by relatively high spillovers according
to Table 3, we observe that, despite some fluctuations, total spillover indices are persistently
high throughout the sample. In Japan, which according to Table 3 also has relatively high
total spillovers, when we take the full sample into account, we see that total spillovers
decline since around 2000 and amount to around 10 percent towards the end of the sample.
Similarly, total spillovers also decline in Canada in the mid 1990s.
The most striking observation is, however, that around the onset of the recent financial
crisis the total spillover indices increase in all countries with the exception of Japan. Thus,
the link between the business cycle and credit growth becomes exceptionally pronounced
during this period, suggesting that the financial sector was exceptionally strongly involved
in the last recession. These results are in line with Helbling et al. (2011) who find that
credit market shocks have been influential in driving global economic activity during the
latest global recession.
Figure 2 shows the time varying net directional spillovers from credit growth to real GDP
growth.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
7The choice of the 50-quarter rolling windows is based on the fact that we wish to capture time varying
total and net spillovers of financial and business cycles. Given that 50-quarters correspond to 12.5 years, the
50-quarter rolling windows adopted in this analysis seem to be long enough to capture the whole business
cycle and the financial cycle (e.g. from the peak to through and back to the peak). However, for robustness
purposes, we have also experimented using alternative n-quarter rolling windows (such as 30, 40 and 60
quarters) and our conclusions reached have not been affected. These results are available upon request.
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In Canada, net spillovers are strongly positive in the 1980s and fluctuate around zero
afterwards. In France and Germany, we observe mostly positive net spillovers until the late
2000s, whereas Italy is characterized by negative spillovers, expect a brief period in the mid
2000s. Net spillovers are negative in Japan since the early 1990s and turned into positive
only recently. In the US we observe a similar pattern, although the increase in net spillovers
is substantially more pronounced. And in the UK, net spillovers frequently change sign (see
Figure 2).
Recall that, according to Figure 1, total spillovers strongly increase before and during the
last recession in almost all countries. Looking at the time–varying net spillovers in Figure 2,
we can explicitly identify the relationship between credit growth and output growth during
this period. Conventional wisdom holds that the financial sector was a major driving force
during the financial crisis in the US and the subsequent global downturn. In line with this
view, we find that credit growth becomes a net transmitter in the US since the mid 2000s.
Similarly, net spillovers turn positive in Japan towards the end of the sample. In Germany
and Italy, credit growth is the dominant transmitter briefly during the onset of the global
financial crisis, but net spillovers turn negative, indicating that through most of the crisis
period, bank credit followed real economic developments in these countries. This observation
is also true in Canada and, to a stronger extent, in France. In the UK, the pattern is less
clear since net spillovers change signs frequently (see Figure 2).
Thus, in most countries, the financial sector played a dominant role during early stages
of the recent financial crisis, while the real sector quickly took over as the dominant source
of spillovers.
3.2. Spillovers across Countries
To examine whether credit expansions and contractions in one country spill over into
other countries’ real and financial sectors we now look at spillovers across the G7 countries.
As it seems plausible that credit market conditions in one country can influence not only
credit in other countries but also their growth rate of output, we estimate a VAR with credit
growth and output growth variables for each country. We drop Italy due to the limited
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data availability. Based on a twelve–variable VAR, we then again conduct the spillover
analysis. Table 4 presents these results. The total spillover index, which receives a value of
48 percent, shows that international spillovers appear to be quantitatively pronounced on
average. More importantly, credit growth in the US is the dominant transmitter of shocks
internationally, and especially to other countries’ real sectors, followed by credit growth in
Japan. For instance, innovations to credit growth in the United States explain 29.2 percent,
20.1 percent, 15.8 percent, 14.1 percent and 6.8 percent of the 12-quarter forecast error
variance of output growth in Canada, UK, Germany, France and Japan, respectively. In
addition, innovations to credit growth in the United States explain 1.6 percent, 1.9 percent,
0.9 percent, 0.6 percent and 2.1 percent of the 12-quarter forecast error variance of credit
growth in the aforementioned countries, respectively. Helbling et al. (2011) and Kollmann
et al. (2011) also find that credit shocks originating in the United States have a significant
impact on the evolution of world growth during global recessions. In addition, our results
suggest that US credit growth is also responsible for the magnification of spillovers within
and between countries’ real and (to lesser extend) financial sectors. Thus, in this study, we
find that the importance of the role financial factors play in the modern business cycle (as
documented by Jorda` et al., 2013) is heterogeneous over the phase of the business cycle.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Turning our attention to the evolution of total spillovers across the G6 countries over
time, we observe according to Figure 3 that total spillovers are considerably high and become
exceptionally pronounced, reaching a peak during extreme economic events, such as the 1987
stock market crash, the Asian crisis and the Great Recession of 2007–2009. This result is
in line with the findings of Claessens et al. (2012) and Jorda` et al. (2013), that indicate a
mutually negative influence of financial turmoil and economic recessions.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 4 shows the time–varying net directional spillovers from credit growth and real
GDP growth across the G6 countries.
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[Insert Figure 4 here]
Overall, the results are very revealing, when we consider the link of credit growth and
GDP growth spillovers across the G7 countries and (financial and real) sectors simultane-
ously. In particular, the dominance of the credit growth spillovers in net terms becomes
extremely less pronounced across the G6 countries and sectors, with the only exception of
Japan, wherein net spillovers from credit growth during the Asian crisis reached around
50%. Interestingly, the US was a net receiver of credit growth spillovers till the beginning
of 2000 and became a net transmitter of credit growth shocks in the run up to (and during)
the global financial crisis and until 2010. After 2010, US GDP growth spillovers in net
terms became the dominant factors of contagion and magnification of shocks, thus gaining
particular importance in the simultaneous feedback effects across the G6 countries’ real and
financial sectors. This suggest that credit growth in the US since the 2000s might have
contributed to the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. The shock in the financial sector was
then transmitted to the real sector which was then fed back to the financial sector creating
rippling effects within and between the G7 countries.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we study the time-varying (dynamic) relationship between credit growth
and real GDP growth at business cycle frequencies for each of the G7 countries using the
spillover index of Diebold and Yilmaz (2012). This technique is perfectly suited to address
the potential bidirectional spillovers of shocks between credit growth and output growth.
We find several stylized facts, which are consistent with existing studies. First, the link
between credit growth and real GDP growth particularly tightens during crises periods. This
result is consistent with the studies from Claessens et al. (2012) and Jorda` et al. (2013),
which indicate a mutually negative influence of financial turmoil and economic recessions.
Our analysis reveals that during such periods, spillovers increase between sectors and also
across G7 countries. Secondly, credit growth is as much a sender as it is a receiver of spillover
shocks, confirming the bidirectional spillovers of shocks between the two sectors. Thirdly,
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credit growth in the US is a dominant international transmitter of shocks and especially
to other countries real sectors. This pattern is most pronounced during the last global
financial crisis. Similarly, Helbling et al. (2011) detect adverse effects of US credit shocks
on the business cycles of the G7 countries during the recent financial crisis.
Furthermore, in the run up period to the global financial crisis, credit growth is a trans-
mitter of shock spillovers in most of the countries in our sample. However, with the start of
the crisis, shocks of real GDP growth become relatively more pronounced. An exception is
the US economy, where the financial sector is a permanent transmitter of net spillovers of
shocks within the US and across the G6 economies during the aforementioned periods.
Finally, the strength and direction of spillover effects evolves rather heterogonously across
the G7 countries. In particular, we detected a group of countries with especially high spillover
effects (i.e. Germany, Japan and the US), and another group of countries (i.e. Canada,
France, Italy and the UK) with relatively low spillover effects between the financial sector
and the real sector.
Future research along these lines is thus called for, so as to clarify these particular
differences in the dynamic evolution of spillovers between credit cycles and business cycles.
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Table 1: Data availability and sources
Country Variable Data Availability Source Table Code
CAN Credit 1957Q1-2012Q4 Statistics Canada 176-0015
GDP 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 156”99BAC”Q
GDP def 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 156”99BIR”Q
FRA Credit 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 132”32”Q
GDP 1970Q1-2012Q3 IMF-IFS 132”99B C”Q
GDP def 1970Q1-2012Q3 IMF-IFS 132”BIR”Q
GER Credit 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 134”32”Q
GDP 1960Q1-2012Q3 IMF-IFS 134”99B C”Q
GDP def 1960Q1-2012Q3 IMF-IFS 134”BIR”Q
ITA Credit 1970Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 136”32”Q
GDP 1980Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 136”99B C”Q
GDP def 1980Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 136”BIR”Q
JAP Credit 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 158”32”Q
GDP 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 158”99BAC”Q
GDP def 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 158”99BIR”Q
UK Credit 1959Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 112”32”Q
GDP 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 112”99B C”Q
GDP def 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 112”99BIR”Q
USA Credit 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 111”32”Q
GDP 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 111”99BAC”Q
GDP def 1957Q1-2012Q4 IMF-IFS 111”99BIR”Q
Note: GDP is seasonally adjusted; the base year of the GDP deflator is 2005. For Canada’s domestic credit
a different data source is used, because (i) the IFS series ends already in 2008Q4 and (ii) in 2001Q4 the series
jumps significantly due to a change in the definition of the indicator (Canada adopted the IMF’s “Monetary
and Financial Statistics Manual 2000” in 2001).
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Table 3: Spillover table of real credit growth and real GDP growth within the G7
CANADA FRANCE
From (j) From (j)
To (i) CREDITgr GDPgr CREDITgr GDPgr
CREDITgr 93.7 6.3 90.3 9.7
GDPgr 8.8 91.2 9.2 90.8
Contr. to others 8.8 6.3 Total Spillover 9.2 9.7 Total Spillover
Contr. inc. own 101.5 97.5 Index = 7.6% 99.5 100.5 Index = 9.4%
GERMANY ITALY
From (j) From (j)
To (i) CREDITgr GDPgr CREDITgr GDPgr
CREDITgr 58.7 41.3 95.0 5.0
GDPgr 31.8 68.2 14.4 85.6
Contr. to others 31.8 41.3 Total Spillover 14.4 5.0 Total Spillover
Contr. inc. own 89.5 109.5 Index = 36.5% 109.4 90.6 Index = 9.7%
JAPAN UK
From (j) From (j)
To (i) CREDITgr GDPgr CREDITgr GDPgr
CREDITgr 72.1 27.9 91.6 8.4
GDPgr 22.1 77.9 7.1 92.9
Contr. to others 22.1 27.9 Total Spillover 7.1 8.4 Total Spillover
Contr. inc. own 94.2 105.8 Index = 25.0% 98.7 100.3 Index = 7.7%
US
From (j)
To (i) CREDITgr GDPgr
CREDITgr 84.2 15.8
GDPgr 27.8 72.2
Contr. to others 27.8 15.8 Total Spillover
Contr. inc. own 112 88 Index = 21.8%
Note: The underlying variance decomposition is based on bivariate VARs (using 12-step-ahead forecasts)
for each country. The spillover indices definition is given in Equations (2)-(7).
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Figure 1: Total Spillovers of real credit growth and real GDP growth within the G7
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Note: Plots of moving total spillovers estimated using 50-quarter rolling windows. Thus the starting date
of the total spillovers within each country is 50 quarters after the initial available date for that country (see
also Table 1). Grey shading denotes US recessions as defined by the NBER.
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Figure 2: Net Spillovers between real credit growth and real GDP growth within the G7
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Note: Plots of moving net spillovers estimated using 50-quarter rolling windows. Thus the starting date of
the net spillovers within each country is 50 quarters after the initial available date for that country (see also
Table 1). Positive (negative) values indicate that credit growth is a net transmitter (receiver) of shocks to
GDP growth. Grey shading denotes US recessions as defined by the NBER.
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Figure 3: Total Spillover of real credit and real GDP growth among the G6
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Note: Plot of the moving total spillover estimated using 50-quarter rolling windows. Thus the starting
date of the total spillovers among the G6 countries is 50 quarters after the initial available date for all G6
countries (see also Table 1). Grey shading denotes US recessions as defined by the NBER.
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Figure 4: Net Spillovers between real credit and real GDP growth among the G6
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Note: Plot of the moving net spillover estimated using 50-quarter rolling windows. Thus the starting date
of the net spillovers among the G6 countries is 50 quarters after the initial available date for all G6 countries
(see also Table 1). Positive (negative) values indicate that the variable of interest is a net transmitter
(receiver) of shocks to the rest of the variables in our analysis. Grey shading denotes US recessions as
defined by the NBER.
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